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Abstract
Background: New technologies constitute an important cost-driver in healthcare, but the dynamics that lead to 
their emergence remains poorly understood from a health policy standpoint. The goal of this paper is to clarify how 
entrepreneurs, investors, and regulatory agencies influence the value of emerging health technologies. 
Methods: Our 5-year qualitative research program examined the processes through which new health technologies 
were envisioned, financed, developed and commercialized by entrepreneurial clinical teams operating in Quebec’s 
(Canada) publicly funded healthcare system. 
Results: Entrepreneurs have a direct influence over a new technology’s value proposition, but investors actively 
transform this value. Investors support a technology that can find a market, no matter its intrinsic value for clinical 
practice or healthcare systems. Regulatory agencies reinforce the “double” value of a new technology —as a health 
intervention and as an economic commodity— and provide economic worth to the venture that is bringing the 
technology to market. 
Conclusion: Policy-oriented initiatives such as early health technology assessment (HTA) and coverage with evidence 
may provide technology developers with useful input regarding the decisions they make at an early stage. But to foster 
technologies that bring more value to healthcare systems, policy-makers must actively support the consideration of 
health policy issues in innovation policy.
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Implications for policy makers
• Entrepreneurs, investors, and regulatory agencies influence a new technology’s value proposition. 
• Entrepreneurs have to strike compromises to expedite sales and generate revenues.
• Investors support technologies that generate health gains by accident, not by design.
• Albeit they do so involuntarily, regulatory agencies provide economic worth to ventures.
• Health policy scholars should contribute to innovation policy.
Implications for the public
The value a new health technology may ultimately bring to healthcare systems is defined at an early stage. This value is shaped by the entrepreneurs 
who create a new company to design and commercialize the technology, by those who invest in their venture and by regulatory agencies. Even when 
entrepreneurs possess formal clinical training, they strike significant compromises to expedite sales. Health policy issues should be considered by 
innovation policy-makers because investors support technologies that generate health gains by accident, not by design.
Key Messages 
Background
Technological Innovation in Healthcare
Health services and policy scholars frequently underscore that 
technology constitutes one important cost-driver that needs 
to be better managed, but less often fully acknowledge that 
a technological solution can be designed in many different 
ways.1-3 Researchers focus their attention downstream, after 
the adoption of a new technology and develop “little insight” 
into the processes that led to its existence.4 Yet, the upstream 
dynamics that affect the emergence of technologies have their 
own ways of picking “winners” up and tossing “losers” aside, 
which may not align with health policy priorities.5 This is why 
policy-oriented initiatives such as early health technology 
assessment (HTA) and “coverage with evidence development” 
are gaining traction, seeking to inform innovation at an earlier 
stage.6-9
The goal of this paper is to contribute to this body of policy-
oriented research by clarifying how entrepreneurs, investors, 
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and regulatory agencies define and influence the value of a 
new technology at an early stage, which spans for a medical 
device from 5 to 10 years of development.10 Our qualitative 
fieldwork was structured around five ventures that had 
been created by clinical teams in the mid 1990s in Quebec 
(Canada), had secured capital investment and obtained 
regulatory approval for their core technology. We interviewed 
those who were part of the design team as well as policy-
makers, investors, and regulatory experts. We also analyzed 
documents that described the evolution of the ventures since 
their inception. 
Below, we introduce a framework of the supply- and demand-
side logics that affect health technology development and 
summarize our methodology. Then, our findings examine 
the respective contribution of entrepreneurs, investors, and 
regulatory agencies to a new technology’s value proposition.11 
Our discussion underscores that early HTA and coverage with 
evidence development initiatives could provide technology 
developers with useful input regarding the decisions they 
make. Yet, to encourage the creation of technologies that bring 
more value to healthcare systems, a more comprehensive 
health innovation policy is needed.
The Interplay Between Health Innovation Supply and Demand 
Since the late 1980s, health policy-makers in most 
industrialized countries have been concerned with the 
adoption and diffusion of new medical technology.12-14 They 
relied among other policy tools on HTA, a process that takes 
place once the technology is on the market and clinical 
evidence has been generated. Although HTA has gained 
recognition worldwide, the decisions made on each and every 
new technology by policy-makers, healthcare managers, 
clinicians, and patients remain multidimensional and the 
evidence needed often arrives late in the adoption process.5 
Recently, the HTA community has increased its efforts to 
produce evidence-based recommendations sooner through 
early HTA. According to the systematic review of Markiewicz 
et al,7 there is great diversity in the early HTA methods 
currently used:
“Early assessment comprises a strategic analysis (including 
stakeholders analysis) of the medical context and the 
competition, evaluation of the economic impact of medical 
devices and early assessment of clinical effectiveness of the 
medical devices under development, all with the aim to 
reduce uncertainty in the developmental stage of a medical 
device.”
The HTA community has also begun examining technologies 
for which disinvestment would be appropriate, hoping 
that valuable innovations could be funded through budget 
reallocation.6 Third-party payers in the United States 
are, indeed, backing off from a “largely cost-unconscious 
demand.”15 To provide “promising new technologies” while 
gathering further evidence about their effectiveness, coverage 
with evidence development strategies have been deployed 
in North America and Europe.8 These strategies consist in a 
pre-market assessment of a technology’s clinical utility, safety, 
and efficacy in view of licensing and coverage criteria.8 The 
objectives are to generate regulatory evidence at an earlier 
stage, decrease risks for manufacturers and investors, and 
thus, encourage and expedite the innovation process. 
The notion that the value of new technology should be defined 
in terms of health policy outcomes (eg, patient safety, quality-
adjusted life years, cost-savings, etc) stands in contrast with 
innovation policy frameworks where technological innovation 
is viewed as a means to generate wealth.16-18 Innovation 
policy relies on a combination of fiscal arrangements and 
research & development (R&D) funding tools. For instance, 
Horizon 2020 projected to spend up to EUR 353.75 million 
in 2016 to support innovation by small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs). The aim of the SME policy instrument 
is to assist “innovative SMEs to shape new markets, create 
growth, and achieve high return on investment.”19 The 
value of technological innovation is here defined in terms of 
innovation policy outcomes, eg, new ventures, highly qualified 
jobs, profits, etc. One may, thus, wonder about the way the 
interplay between innovation policy and health policy, which 
value different outcomes and operate according to different 
logics, affects the development of new health technologies.20 
This is the research question this paper seeks to address.
The framework depicted in Figure derives from the 
literature and draws on our previous phases of fieldwork 
research.10,21,22 This framework does not do full justice to 
the nuances and variations that characterize specific health 
innovation policies across industrialised countries.2,3 But it 
illustrates that innovation policy contributes to supply-side 
dynamics and health policy to demand-side dynamics with 
very few coordination mechanisms to align their respective 
actions.5 Typically, innovation policies and health policies are 
governed as 2 distinct government portfolios, which draw 
their respective directions and resources from 2 different 
ministries.6 
The framework suggests, more specifically, that entrepreneurs, 
�
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Figure. Analytical Framework.
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investors, and regulatory agencies may influence the value 
proposition of a new technology, which refers to “the value 
created for users by the offering based on the technology.”11 
Although clinicians who create ventures may have a sense of 
users’ expectations, their activities are conditioned by supply-
side logics, including financial markets and business media 
(which encompasses electronic and print newspapers and 
magazines that cover business and economic issues). Capital 
investors define the level and types of financial and human 
resources made available for a venture to engage in R&D 
activities and develop a business plan.21 As emerging ventures 
must convince shareholders and business analysts that 
through successive advances they are getting closer to the goal 
of generating returns on investment, financial markets and the 
business-oriented media are influential since they affect the 
level of enthusiasm and trust investors may manifest toward 
specific ventures.16,17 Among the demand-side logics, health 
policy concerns become more tangible once innovations have 
obtained regulatory approval and are introduced into clinical 
practice. Since ventures seek to penetrate several markets 
simultaneously or successively, this framework acknowledges 
that those who steer their development may take regulatory, 
HTA, reimbursement and procurement strategies into 
consideration.3,13
Methods
To generate an in-depth analysis of how key innovation 
stakeholders contribute to technology development, our 
fieldwork involved a phased approach wherein we gathered a 
multifaceted corpus of qualitative data. According to Sutton,22 
extensive and carefully reported qualitative fieldwork provides 
a legitimate and important contribution to the management 
scholarship by emphasizing meanings, logics, and processes. 
Our data collection strategy was organized around 5 
Montreal-based ventures that had emerged from healthcare 
settings in the mid 1990s and whose core innovations were 
in the early stage of commercialization when our study began 
in 2008. We purposefully selected cases whose “information 
content” was likely to be rich and accessible.23 These ventures 
had all won awards for entrepreneurship and Montreal, the 
largest metropolitan centre in Quebec, had established a 
solid presence in the Canadian medical device industry. By 
choosing ventures that had started their R&D operations at 
the same period and in the same province, we, thus, included 
cases that evolved within a similar policy context and 
economic climate.
More specifically, Table 1 indicates the gaps the 5 ventures 
sought to address in the domains of breast imaging, 
cardiology, obstetrics, home monitoring and orthopaedic 
surgery and the value propositions of their technology. These 
cases offered variations along our analytical constructs,23 
a feature likely to increase the theoretical relevance of our 
observations. The technologies they developed perform 
different clinical functions — diagnostic, therapeutic, 
decision-support, and monitoring — and were targeted at 
different users and purchasers. As a result, these ventures’ 
technology development activities involved overcoming 
different technical and clinical challenges and negotiating the 
expectations of different stakeholders and users.
As Table 2 summarizes, we gathered multiple data sources 
during the preliminary data collection phase, the detailed data 
collection phase and the analysis and debriefing phase of our 
fieldwork. Qualitative data included exploratory interviews, 
which helped our team to get a better sense of the financial, 
commercial and regulatory challenges affecting technology 
development and to subsequently refine our data collection 
tools and strategies. We also conducted formal interviews that 
provided us with a significant understanding of how external 
stakeholders interact with health technology ventures. 
All interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim 
(transcriptions were sent to respondents for validation). 
The content of the ventures’ websites was retrieved between 
October and December 2008 and an extensive media coverage 
analysis was performed (1998-2009). All these downloadable 
documents were indexed and analyzed, including press 
releases and annual reports.
Consistent with a phased fieldwork approach, we adopted 
an iterative analytical strategy in which our theorizing 
efforts alternated with empirical analyses.22 Our analyses 
were supported by the QDA Miner qualitative data analysis 
software, which enabled us to constitute an integrated 
database. To support the different analyses that we had planned 
for our fieldwork, we applied a mixed coding strategy wherein 
codes were both deductively and inductively generated and 
Table 1. The Gap Addressed by 5 Health Technology-Based Ventures and Their Technology’s Value Proposition
Innovation Gap Value Proposition
Optical molecular imaging device for breast cancer diagnosis 
and characterisation
Limitations and risks in 
mammography 
Providing early breast cancer diagnostic and eventually 
monitoring treatment more safely
Line of cryoablation catheters for the treatment of arrhythmia
Risks of existing heat-based 
treatments 
Providing an improved technology that may cure a 
widespread health problem
Decision-support software to monitor prolonged labour and 
abnormal foetal heart rates and help detect birth-related 
injuries
Subjectivity underlying 
obstetrical practice 
Preventing rare but costly obstetrical complications by 
predicting objectively birth-related injuries
Home telehealth solution comprising a set of coordination 
tools to promote continuity of care for chronically ill patients
Poor management of chronic 
illness and uncoordinated 
services
Improving the management of chronically ill patients and 
preventing the use of costly resources through home 
monitoring and patient empowerment
Computer-assisted navigation system to support MIS 
orthopaedic surgery such as hip, knee, and spine implants
Limitations and risks in 
orthopaedic MIS 
Increasing accuracy in orthopaedic surgical practice and 
reducing complications
Abbreviation: MIS, minimally invasive.
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regularly discussed within the research team. For the current 
paper, the analytical aim we pursued was to flesh out the 
overarching lessons of our research program with the help 
of the framework presented earlier.23 To reconstruct with as 
much accuracy as possible the processes that interviewees 
described, the interviews’ content was triangulated with 
the other data sources. To this end, we extracted factual 
information from documents that covered on average a 15-
year period. Applying a constant comparative method of 
analysis, our team actively searched for evidence that would 
contradict our emerging analytical insights. Finally, during the 
analysis and debriefing phase, we gathered key feedback from 
technology developers, clinicians, and patient representatives. 
In the next section, we clarify how entrepreneurs, investors, 
and regulatory agencies respectively define and influence 
a new technology’s value proposition. When we quote 
excerpts from interviews (translated from French to English 
when applicable), “Dev” refers to technology developers, 
“Inv” to capital investors, and “Reg” to regulators. Other 
alphanumerical indexes refer to media excerpts.
Results
Entrepreneurs
When health technology-based ventures are created, they 
often lack business expertise and may not have a clear idea 
of how their technology will create value. Yet, entrepreneurs 
must articulate a business plan to obtain resources from 
capital investors.11,21 The entrepreneurial clinical teams 
we studied gave an initial direction to the technology 
development process and made, later on, a number of 
compromises to address clinical, business, and regulatory 
concerns. These entrepreneurs pursued different motivations 
such as successfully engineering a technically sophisticated 
solution, bringing about a clinical paradigm shift or seeking 
to help patients. For one of the developers we interviewed, 
a new technology should possess, in principle, at least three 
valuable features:
“First, it must fulfill a need patients have. Then, it must be 
effective, be able to treat not only 40% of patients. And it 
must be efficient. So we’re talking about productivity too. 
‘Effective’ is about doing the right thing, ‘efficiency’ is about 
doing many more things. So it means treating many patients 
with lower costs for healthcare systems” (Dev C1).
Although strong input by clinicians helps to increase the 
clinical relevance of the value proposition of a new technology, 
the final technology may not always reflect this input. These 
entrepreneurs have to strike significant compromises to 
expedite sales and generate revenues and system-level 
challenges may easily skip under their radar.
For example, the initial goals of the labour decision-support 
software venture of engaging women more actively in their 
care and of reducing unnecessary C-sections vanished. 
This venture gathered user feedback long after its key R&D 
activities took place and faced significant commercialization 
challenges: because “high volume productivity is very 
lucrative for a physician,” the technology “may be best for 
the patient, but it is financially not best for the physician. 
It may be morally and socially good for the physician, but 
there’s a financial penalty” (Dev L1). Realizing that its value 
proposition was not sufficiently appealing to obstetricians, 
the venture decided to target physician insurers. Its design 
efforts were then geared at providing value to risk liability 
managers by furthering the medico-legal and administrative 
features of the system (with the aim of documenting care 
processes in case things go wrong). Hence, the types of benefit 
a technology may eventually bring to healthcare systems not 
only depend upon the users one seeks to satisfy (physicians, 
nurses, patients, etc), but also upon the likely purchaser 
(hospitals, physician insurers, national health systems, etc). 
We examined in greater depth how business models influence 
technology design priorities. A business model articulates 
a technology’s value proposition with its market segment, 
revenue model, production system, and commercial 
strategy.11 It, thus, “freezes” the value proposition, including 
Table 2. The Data Gathered During Our Fieldwork
Fieldwork Component Data Sources
Preliminary data collection phase:
•	 To generate an overview of the phenomenon, to gather key 
information about 5 ventures, to select the three cases to 
be documented in the subsequent phase and adjust data 
collection tools accordingly
•	 Exploratory interviews (60-120 min) with CEOs and high-level executives of 5 
ventures and with experts in regulatory affairs and technology transfer (n = 11)
•	 Analysis of all documents retrieved in 2008 that described the activities of the 
ventures since their inception (mid 1990s):
•	 Press releases (n = 568)
•	 Annual reports (n = 21)
•	 Promotional documents (n = 23)
Detailed data collection phase:
•	 To generate an in-depth understanding of technology 
developers’ practices and rationales 
•	 Semi-structured interviews (90-120 min) with clinicians and scientists who 
contributed to the creation of three ventures (n = 9)
•	 To document external stakeholders’ practices and 
contribution to technology development processes
•	 Semi-structured interviews (35-120 min) with capital investors (n = 6), regulators 
(n = 3), and policy-makers (n = 5)
•	 Notes recorded during and after industry events observation (n = 6)
•	 Media coverage analysis of all printed and electronic content published in English 
or French (n = 814) that mentioned the ventures, their CEOs and products 
between 1998 and 2009, retrieved through CBCA and Biblio Branchée databases 
Analysis and debriefing phase:
•	 To analyse and share findings, obtain feedback and collect 
additional data
•	 Scientific and policy-oriented presentations of preliminary findings (n = 14)
•	 Three mixed focus groups that engaged in two structured deliberations (60 min 
each with technology developers, clinicians, and patient representatives (n = 19)
Abbreviation: CEO, chief executive officer.
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to whom value is offered. The heart ablation catheter 
venture adopted an archetypical business model for ventures 
operating in the biomedical sciences. By relying on a large 
network of clinician-investigators across North America and 
Europe, it conducted clinical studies in several different areas 
altogether. These medical specialists contributed to develop 
the knowledge basis required for regulatory approval, but 
also to the international clinical marketing of a technology 
that fitted well with reimbursement systems (ie, fee-for-
service). As a result, this venture’s growth meant revenues for 
entrepreneurs, investors, and users. 
In sharp contrast, the capacity of the home monitoring 
system venture to grow and generate revenues was very 
limited. The initial goal was to create a clinically-oriented 
system that “could provide those who are really sick with a 
personal assistant that would help them to follow their health 
status and share that data with clinical staff ” (Dev N2). For 
achieving this goal, a collaborative approach was established 
at an early stage: 
“We started getting lots of feedback from healthcare 
providers. All of us, the 4-5 programmers at that time, we 
were working in a room the hospital had given to us. The 
providers developing the clinical protocols for our system 
were there too. As soon as they had an issue, they would turn 
to us, and we were right beside!” (Dev 2N).
Even though effective partnerships with hospitals and a co-
design strategy with users enabled the venture to provide 
value to clinicians and hospitals, its business model remained 
fragmentary. The monitoring system addressed an important 
system-level challenge since it was designed to reduce 
unnecessary hospitalizations and emergency room visits. Such 
a technology could, in principle, create value for hospitals 
that have incentives to prevent deterioration of chronically ill 
patients, such as health maintenance organizations (HMOs) 
in the United States, or coordinated care models in publicly 
funded systems. Nevertheless, the venture never really 
succeeded in articulating a revenue model that could translate 
the “distributed benefits” it offered (to patients, clinicians, 
hospitals, homecare organizations, and third-party payers) 
into a single stream of revenues. The technology was designed 
as if the patient’s best interest was a sufficient incentive for 
hospitals and homecare providers to work collaboratively and 
thus, together “buy in” the new technology. This proved very 
hard to achieve in practice and the venture was sold before its 
entrepreneurs could find out ways to scale up its technology.
Overall, for entrepreneurs who tap on their healthcare 
experience to create a venture, defining a new technology’s 
value proposition entails a double pledge: their technology 
shall be able to generate revenues in order to engender health 
benefits. 
Investors 
Investors who decide to support ventures commit their 
resources for a specified period of time with the aim of 
recouping their investments and generating returns. They 
actively transform the value proposition of a new technology 
since their aim is to bring the venture to the most profitable 
“exit,” which may happen through the acquisition of the 
venture by another company or an initial public offering 
(IPO) that provides the ability to sell shares to the public. To 
diversify risks and increase the likelihood of success, investors’ 
decisions are made within the context of a broader investment 
portfolio and their role is to maximize the shareholders’ 
good.10,17 
“We’re portfolio managers [...]. Over 10 investments we 
gonna do, in general, there’s one that will bring in 20, 30, 
40 times our bet. There’s going to have 2 or 3 that will go 
bankrupt, and with the other 6, either we’ll lose a little, or 
we’ll recover a little more money. So basically, for us it’s 
the average, it’s the batting average: my shareholder will be 
happy if, say, that with the $ 100M that I’ll put in ... I don’t 
know in 10-12 investments —these are arbitrary numbers—I 
bring back to my shareholder 120-130M $. So this is when 
he’s happy” (Inv4).
While investors recognize that they rely on “a process that 
remains very subjective even if it’s dressed up with all kinds 
of facts” (Inv3), when they choose to support a particular 
venture they ask entrepreneurs to come up with a business 
plan in which the opportunities for growth are clear and 
impressive. How swiftly a venture progresses is of interest not 
only to investors, but also to business analysts and journalists 
who comment publicly on its promissory value. Below is a 
typical business press excerpt wherein the core innovation is 
described as holding the potential to address multiple clinical 
needs, which represent large or growing markets: 
“[Breast imaging technology] should be on sale in 2002, 
launched into a worldwide market for diagnostic imaging 
systems that topped US$10.1 billion in 1998. Experts predict 
it will grow to over US$14.7 billion by 2004. [CEO] has plans 
to scale: ‘We’re already looking at applying this technology 
to brain cancer and other tissue —the potential is huge’” 
(GB-4).
The media emphasis on opportunities for growth is a not a 
simple form of hype. Investors do not engage in plain business 
activities, but in business activities that offer speculative 
opportunities. What matters is the value ventures may 
generate within a period of 5-7 years. These ventures must 
attract additional investors and/or shareholders. And they 
must grow. 
While the business-oriented media does not address the 
health value of a new technology in much detail, it provides 
potential investors and business partners with figures that 
translate health risks into potentially lucrative markets. For 
instance, the business case for the labour decision-support 
software emphasized litigation costs: 
“From the perspective of a physician malpractice insurer, 
obstetrical liability payments usually form the largest 
portion of all malpractice dollars paid out. One obstetrical 
complication, shoulder dystocia, is responsible for anywhere 
from 900 to 1500 permanently disabled newborns every year 
and constitutes the second highest category of payouts in OB” 
(SNB-1).
While reducing malpractice costs may not be considered a 
health policy goal per se, such risks do represent a significant 
business opportunity. In fact, from an investment standpoint, 
the technology a venture is developing has no intrinsic value: 
it is neither good nor bad. The issue is whether it can “find its 
purchaser” and sell.
“Unfortunately, the quality of the technology and the fact 
that it is marketed and marketable, sometimes there isn’t 
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necessarily a match between the two. You can have a great 
technology that will end up forgotten and you can have 
something that is very ordinary but that will be a commercial 
success” (Inv1).
This logic creates tension with clinically trained entrepreneurs 
who believe their technology possesses clinical value and 
often struggle to improve its performance within the time 
and money constraints their investors have set. Investors 
seek the commercialization path with the least resistance and 
invariably prioritize compromises that may expedite sales. 
Whether the technology delivers its promises (or fails to do 
so) matters, but it remains, to a certain point, secondary to 
the value of the venture itself. The fate of most technology-
based ventures is to be sold to an established firm when their 
economic value is the highest. This partly explains why news 
regarding the boards of directors, partnerships, business 
awards or financial statements occupies a lot of media space. 
For speculation to take place, the initial promises of these 
emerging firms must be high. Yet, the fact the technologies will 
not entirely fulfill their clinical promises is not problematic 
from the speculative logic of capital investment. To begin 
with, it is the investment portfolio as a whole that has to 
generate returns. Then, investors reduce the risks underlying 
each “deal” by choosing ventures whose value propositions 
are aimed at large and reachable markets, align with 
reimbursement systems or do not interfere with physician 
revenues. Overall, venture capital supports technologies that 
generate health gains by accident, not by design.
Regulatory Agencies 
Regulatory agencies in North America and notified bodies 
in Europe set criteria and processes regarding the types of 
proof health technology-based ventures must produce for 
pre-market assessment, market clearance or post-market 
surveillance.24 Obtaining regulatory approval is one of the 
most important business achievements of a venture since 
it opens up the market, making sales and diffusion within 
specific countries possible. For regulatory agencies, the value 
of a new technology lies in its ability to demonstrate its safety 
and efficacy, ie, that it does what it is supposed to do. Civil 
servants who execute the appraisals rely on science and must 
use their expertise and judgment:
“For a specific device type, we don’t have anywhere written, 
okay, for this one, you need to have 200, 300, 400, 500 
patients enrolled in a trial, before we would allow this to be 
cleared. I don’t think we have these written out. For some 
technologies, I guess they know by experience that you’d 
want to see a clinical study with so many patients because 
less would not show the outcomes that you’re looking for, you 
know, the end points of the study. So, I think … it’s kind of 
absolute that the device has to be safe and effective, but there 
is … there’re degrees to which there is safety. Depending on 
what the device does, maybe different numbers or different 
patients you would need to show, to demonstrate the safety 
and effectiveness” (Reg2).
Unlike HTA or coverage with evidence strategies, regulatory 
approval does not examine costs, clinical relevance or impact 
on healthcare systems. 
“We sometimes see applications which we call ‘me too’ 
applications. It’s no different from twenty other ones out 
there, but the manufacturer wants to get in this business and 
we say fine. You know the world doesn’t need yet another one 
of these things, but fine if you want to sell one, you get one. 
So we don’t judge whether this is really beneficial or new” 
(Reg3).
One may, thus, wonder whether the early production of 
regulatory evidence that coverage with evidence development 
strategies call for are likely to affect, at an early stage, the 
innovativeness or types of benefit of the new technologies 
entrepreneurs are seeking to develop. Yet, one important 
way in which regulatory agencies partly affect the value 
proposition of a new technology is by requiring structured 
information regarding the technology as well as the venture 
seeking to bring it to market. On the one hand, depending on 
the level of risk of the device it is developing, the venture has 
to produce specific types of proof and thus, conduct clinical 
trials. On the other hand, it must show the soundness of its 
corporate structure, manufacturing facilities and governance. 
Regulatory agencies, thus, indirectly bring about structural 
changes in ventures by asking them to produce evidence and 
to adhere to various ISO norms. 
Regulatory experts operate on scientific grounds that are 
close to health research, but their decisions are bounded 
by the mission of their agency, which is to decide whether 
market access is warranted or not: “We would not take costs 
into consideration either at licensing time or post market. It’s 
sort of... do you want to buy the cheapest car on the market or 
do you want to buy a fancy car. The cheap one isn’t as nice as the 
fancy one, but they’re both legal” (Reg3). This logic reinforces 
the “double” value of an innovative health technology, as 
a health intervention, which depends upon its ability to 
generate health gains and as an economic commodity, which 
depends upon its ability to generate profits. 
Obtaining regulatory approval is important for health and 
economic reasons altogether since it legitimizes the demand 
for a new technology: physicians, hospitals, and patients are 
likely to trust the technology is safe and effective, and investors 
and shareholders can estimate the size of the markets to be 
seized. In addition, if safety problems arise once a technology 
has been approved, established post-marketing procedures 
will help to protect the public and the manufacturer and 
its shareholders too. By adhering to these procedures, the 
ventures can justify their decisions and protect the value of 
their business. Albeit they do so involuntarily, regulatory 
agencies provide economic worth to ventures. This is all the 
more evident for firms that are listed on the stock exchange 
since market clearance, plus the prospect of sales within 
large geographical markets, boosts investors’ confidence. 
Such events figure prominently in the business news with the 
consequent increase in the share price.
Ultimately, regulatory approval “freezes” the value of a new 
technology. For instance, a decision to improve an early version 
of the heart ablation catheter approved by the American Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) was made by considering 
whether or not the current market for this product “pays for 
a new clinical study” (Dev A1). Estimating that such a study 
would cost around $10-15 million and that sales would not 
be dramatically increased, the catheter remained as it was 
when first approved. In fact, once approved on the market, 
only minor changes can be brought to a technology’s design 
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and manufacturing process without necessitating additional 
regulatory review.
To summarize, our findings clarify how entrepreneurs, 
investors, and regulatory agencies respectively define and 
influence a new technology’s value proposition. More 
specifically, Table 3 indicates that value is defined as a double 
pledge by entrepreneurs, as a speculative financial opportunity 
by investors and as requiring safety and efficacy evidence as 
well as organizational auditability by regulators. Each of these 
definitions of value may be seen as partially complementing 
each other, but they also generate tensions in the way the 
value proposition of a new technology is transformed at an 
early stage: an issue that we discuss in further detail below.
Discussion
We now summarize our study’s contribution and provide 
policy insights regarding the interplay between innovation 
policy and health policy, which shapes new health technology 
by deploying different logics and valuing different outcomes.
Contribution of our Study
We began this paper by underscoring the lack of coordination 
mechanisms between innovation policy and health policy 
that typically prevails in industrialised countries.5 This 
may be partly explained by the historical processes by 
which governance structures gradually took shape since the 
emergence of the welfare state. Yet, such a lack of coordination 
proves problematic considering the complexity, policy 
impacts and costs of today’s health innovation.25 Within this 
perspective, our study’s contribution to current knowledge is, 
we believe, two-fold. 
First, our findings provide a detailed understanding of the 
way key upstream actors define and influence the value 
proposition of new technologies. For clinicians who create 
ventures, value lies in a double pledge wherein clinical 
improvements and a profitable business may dovetail (see 
Table 3). They have a direct influence over a new technology’s 
value proposition by articulating clinical needs and providing 
precious input regarding the context in which the technology 
will be used.2,3,5 Yet, the fate of their entrepreneurial endeavor 
remains largely structured by financing strategies and 
regulatory requirements. Investors value innovations that can 
find a market — no matter their intrinsic value for clinical 
practice or healthcare systems. They actively influence a new 
technology’s value proposition by prioritizing technology 
design decisions that facilitate sales. Regulatory agencies value 
proofs of safety and efficacy, but ignore relevance and costs. 
While their requirements concern a limited part of a new 
technology’s value proposition, these agencies increase the 
economic value of the ventures that obtain market approval. 
This point is important since entrepreneurs and investors 
generally criticize regulatory agencies for the time they take to 
do reviews and often characterize regulatory requirements as 
hindering the innovation process.6,9,15 Our study rather shows 
that those who invest in ventures also extract value from the 
regulatory process.
Second, our findings lend support to the body of policy-
oriented initiatives that seek to interface health policy with 
innovation policy.6-9 Although their respective impact on 
the value proposition of a new technology appears uneven, 
both innovation policy and health policy affect the way small 
firms may conceive of, and develop, innovative technologies. 
Whereas the value of a new technology for innovation policy 
primarily lies in the economic activities it may generate, its 
value for health policy requires evidence regarding the nature 
and size of its benefits.14,26,27 As our findings showed, to secure 
investments entrepreneurs must make a persuasive business 
case, but as they progress along the innovation development 
pathway, it is the regulatory requirements that condition the 
kinds of evidence they will generate. During this timeframe, 
entrepreneurs have to make technology design compromises, 
including some that significantly transform the value of the 
new technology. For instance, a technology like the decision-
support software could be seen as valuable from a health 
system perspective if it effectively reduced unnecessary 
C-sections, but less valuable if its main outcome is to reduce 
risks for medical insurers. Notwithstanding the fact that 
the value of an innovation may still change once it becomes 
more widely adopted,3 the compromises that investors and 
entrepreneurs agree upon do affect the type and importance 
of health system benefits a new technology may deliver. One 
must also acknowledge that innovation stakeholders do not 
operate within a similar time horizon to provide value to an 
innovation. For instance, entrepreneurs focus on improving 
the technology’s performance for specific clinical indications, 
whereas investors are aiming for large markets and rapid 
growth. Hence, policy-oriented initiatives such as early 
HTA and coverage with evidence development may provide 
technology developers with precious input regarding the 
health consequences of the compromises that are considered 
Table 3. A Summary of How Entrepreneurs, Investors, and Regulatory Agencies Define and Influence a New Technology’s Value Proposition
How Value Is Defined Impact on the Value Proposition 
Entrepreneurs (clinical 
teams) 
Value entails a double pledge:
•	 A profitable business model 
•	 Health benefits 
Formulation of an initial value proposition that can be developed and 
tested through clinical studies 
Capital investors Value is speculative:
•	 To generate returns, a technology-based venture 
must grow within a pre-determined timeframe 
•	 Health risks represent a business opportunity 
Transformation of the value proposition into a “sellable” product that:
•	 Addresses large and reachable markets
•	 Generates clinical value for physicians and does not conflict with 
revenues
•	 Aligns with reimbursement systems 
Regulatory agencies Value requires evidence of:
•	 Safety and efficacy of the technology
•	 Auditability of its manufacturer
Production of proofs 
Market clearance increases the economic and clinical value of the 
venture and brings the innovation process to a halt
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at an early stage. Yet, to foster technologies that bring more 
value to health systems, we believe a more comprehensive 
health innovation policy is necessary.
Policy Insights
For several policy observers, the 2 policy agendas of “health” 
and “wealth” can be reconciled.20 The presumption is that 
encouraging entrepreneurial activities in the domestic health 
technology industry can generate economic and health 
benefits altogether. For instance, the Canadian Advisory 
Panel on Healthcare Innovation recommended that Health 
Canada in collaboration with Industry Canada develop “a 
whole-of-government federal strategy to support the growth 
of Canadian commercial enterprises in the healthcare field” 
and thus, better exploit the “dual potential” of this industry.28 
Such emphasis is not entirely surprising. The premise 
that technology-based ventures support economic growth 
pervades innovation policy frameworks across industrialized 
countries. Yet, this premise is poorly supported by current 
scholarship on entrepreneurship. For Nightingale and Coad, 
innovation policy-makers fail to recognize the limited 
generalizability of the available evidence: 
“In some atypical places like Silicon Valley, high-tech 
entrepreneurship can be a major driver of innovation and 
economic growth, but care must be taken in extrapolating 
from these exceptional conditions. But in many other areas 
the evidence suggests the contribution of entrepreneurial 
start-ups to the economy is limited and in some cases can be 
potentially damaging.”18
Our findings suggest that supply-side logics shape the kinds 
of innovation patients and healthcare systems get more 
powerfully than demand-side logics. Considering that a 
technology that “sells” may not align with health system level 
priorities, we do not believe that the tension between health 
and wealth goals can be resolved without a deliberate policy 
intervention to foreground demand-side logics. In other 
words, health policy-makers should actively support the 
consideration of health policy issues in innovation policy. 
This should be facilitated by the fact that the literature on the 
downstream phases of health innovation is abundant, showing 
the many obstacles and challenges clinicians, managers, and 
patients face.1,2 These challenges may relate, more specifically, 
to the diffusion phase, that is, an innovation’s passive spread, 
to its dissemination phase when “active and planned efforts 
to persuade target groups” to adopt it are pursued, to its 
implementation phase when similar efforts to mainstream 
it are deployed within organizations or to its sustainability 
phase when it enters into routine use (until it reaches 
obsolescence).25
What our study has foregrounded is the notion that many 
of the challenges characterizing the later phases of the 
innovation lifecycle are determined at a much earlier stage, 
when the ventures are seeking to develop a new technology as 
well as a preliminary business plan in order to secure capital 
investments.21 Within this perspective, Box 1 summarizes 
our fieldwork into five lessons that can inform a more 
comprehensive health innovation policy. Such policy has to 
ponder the different logics at play and the kinds of outcome 
that are valued, measured and rewarded by innovation 
stakeholders and which barely overlap with the needs and 
Box 1. Five Lessons for Health Innovation Policy
• Clinical leadership and user involvement are not sufficient 
for a new health technology to respond to important 
healthcare system needs and challenges. 
• The initial value proposition is malleable, but the business 
model “freezes” this value at an early stage. 
• Initial promises must be high and the fact that they rarely 
will be realized is not problematic from a speculative 
standpoint.
• Venture capital supports valuable health technologies by 
accident, not by design.
• Regulatory approval provides both economic and clinical 
value to health technology-based ventures.
challenges of healthcare systems.
Limitations and Further Research 
To our knowledge, this is the first empirical study to 
examine 3 categories of actor who profoundly structure 
how health technology-based ventures emerge. Very rarely 
scientific journals in the health field publish studies that 
examine the viewpoints of entrepreneurs and investors on 
health technology development processes. Such studies 
are traditionally directed to innovation management and 
entrepreneurship journals. Considering that these journals 
cannot do full justice to health policy issues, studies like ours 
are not without limitations, but bring important insights to a 
health policy audience. 
The use of an explicit framework to synthesize the empirical 
evidence we examined in greater depth in separate publications 
increases the credibility of our findings.22 Our study brought 
to the fore meanings and logics that are largely shaped by 
institutional rules and, as such, may not require a very large 
sample of respondents to attain empirical saturation. Our 
study does, indeed, differ from qualitative research that 
primarily explores perceptions, attitudes or motivations 
that may span a large spectrum (for instance, attitudes and 
practices toward childhood vaccination). It should also be 
underscored that entrepreneurs and investors were eager 
to share with us their expertise and knowledge, they were 
passionate about their work and candidly share their views 
about the innovation development and policy issues they 
felt required improvements. Indeed, we were not seeking to 
gather information that had a strategic business or financial 
value and which could have generated discomfort. 
The transferability of our findings to other settings should be 
appraised acknowledging that innovation policies in Canada 
are influenced culturally and economically by the United 
States, but its health policies are aligned with those of European 
countries where healthcare is publicly funded like the United 
Kingdom.13 In addition, Canadian health technology firms 
are strongly dependent on exports to North American and 
European markets and must, therefore, be responsive to the 
commercialization challenges of an international market. The 
international nature of health technology development and 
the important similarities innovation policies share across 
industrialized countries17 suggest that our findings can help 
to understand health innovation processes in other settings. 
Nonetheless, our findings focused on ventures and are, 
Lehoux  et al
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2017, 6(9), 509–518 517
thus, not reflective of the R&D activities performed by large 
medical device manufacturers. 
Our findings pinpoint areas for further research. For instance, 
are there innovation policy instruments that formally require 
a more active role on the part of demand-side actors? Do such 
policy instruments prevent cooptation of users and third-party 
payers by supply-side actors? Further research could examine 
how supply-side actors respond to the strategic importance 
of protecting the sustainability of healthcare systems. Garber 
and colleagues suggest that American policy-makers should 
“offer greater financial rewards for inventing low-cost 
technologies—and less reward for inventing high-cost ones.”14 
Considering that such a technology creation paradigm shift 
“could benefit patients across the globe,” further research on 
technological innovation and healthcare system sustainability 
is warranted.14 Similarly, it would be worthwhile to explore 
how new approaches such as responsible research and 
innovation (RRI), could be adapted more specifically to health 
innovation.29 RRI, which is gaining traction in the European 
policy landscape, not only calls for the involvement of multiple 
stakeholders, including the publics, but it also argues in favour 
of a deliberate and continuous ex ante consideration of what 
is collectively expected from innovation. Further research 
could examine how RRI helps to handle the uncertainty that 
characterises innovation at an early stage by implementing 
inclusive anticipatory and participatory processes that foster 
reflexivity and responsiveness.
Conclusion
Since the late 1980s, industrialized countries have been 
seeking ways to better manage technological innovation in 
health while ensuring safety, innovation and access.12 For 
Sapolsky, the result of these contradictory desires is that 
“there is much more promotion than control of medical 
progress.”12 Our study confirms that health policy scholars 
should carefully examine innovation policy because 
established upstream dynamics shape in important ways the 
kinds of innovation patients and healthcare systems get. One 
key challenge is to understand how innovation policy can 
foster the development of technologies that address the most 
pressing healthcare needs and not those that threaten the 
sustainability of healthcare systems. 
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